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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-STRIKE BENEFITS MAY BE G1FrS-Tax-
payer received assistance from a labor union while he was participating in a 
strike called by the union. The area in which he lived had become a 
distressed area as a consequence of the strike, and the union had established 
a general program of aid for strikers with no other source of income.1 Both 
before and after he joined the union payments were made to taxpayer under 
this program. Taxpayer sued for a refund of the income tax he payed on 
the value of the assistance so received, and the jury returned a verdict in his 
favor, finding the payments to be gifts.2 The trial court entered judgment 
for the Government despite this verdict.3 The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reversed4 on the grounds that strike assistance, regardless of 
whether it is a gift, is not within the statutory definition of gross income,5 
and that in any event the jury's verdict must stand. On certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, three Justices dissenting. When 
the payment of strike benefits is motivated by charitable considerations, 
the payments may be excluded from gross income as gifts. United States v. 
Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960). 
All of the opinions relied upon Commissioner v. Duberstein,6 a "gift" 
case argued with the principal case and decided earlier the same day. The 
Court had held in cases prior to Duberstein that to qualify as a gift under 
section 102 (a) a transfer must have been voluntary and without considera-
tion,7 and the motive of the transferor must have been generous and dis-
interested rather than selfish.8 In Duberstein the Court qualified this 
Senator Kennedy and passed by the Senate, 106 CoNG. REc. 15524, 15532 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 
1960), would have applied an enterprise test to construction firms with an annual gross 
income greater than $350,000. However, the House extensions were more conservative. 
Although the original House bill, H. R. 12677, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), would have 
created an enterprise test in the retail sales area, even this expansion was denied by the 
substitution of H.R. 12853, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), 106 CONG. REc. 14149 (daily ed. 
June 30, 1960), which deleted all reference to an enterprise test and made only limited 
changes in coverage in the retail field. No compromise was reached between these two 
bills before adjournment. 
1 Payments under this program were made only to strikers, but were made without 
regard to union membership. Nothing was required of the recipient in return for pay-
ments, but the taxpayer voluntarily joined the union after receiving aid for four months, 
and did participate in picketing. He did not pay fees or dues to the union when he 
joined or thereafter. 
2 Gifts are excluded from gross income by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102 (a). However, 
"gift" is not defined by the code. 
s Kaiser v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wis. 1958). 
4 Kaiser v. United States, 262 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958). 
5 Gross income is defined by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a). If the payments were 
not covered by this definition they would not have been taxable, whether or not they were 
gifts under § 102 (a). 
6 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
7 Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
8 Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 
(1949). But cf. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943). 
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by adopting the view, espoused by the dissent in Bogardus v. Commissioner,o 
that whether a transfer is a gift is a question of fact, not of law. Moreover, 
the Court in Duberstein indicated in dictum that the motive of the trans-
feror, to be determined by the trier of facts applying his "experience with 
the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case," 
is of decisive importance in resolving this question.lo There was a diversity 
of opinion in the principal case derived from a disagreement concerning the 
application of the Duberstein standard to the facts of this case. 
The Chief Justice, and Justices Black and Douglas, joined Mr. Justice 
Brennan in the plurality opinion which held that there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to have concluded that the assistance was a gift and 
not pay for striking,11 and was not motivated basically by the constraint of 
any moral or legal duty,12 nor by the hope of economic gain, but rather by 
charitable impulses.13 For these Justices this concluded the case, for in 
light of Duberstein the verdict must stand if it is supported by evidence.14 
In sharp contrast, Justices Frankfurter and Clark disposed of the alternative 
ground relied upon by the court below, before discussing the question of 
gift. They found that strike assistance is included in gross income unless 
excluded as a gift by section 102 (a), and thought it unrealistic to suppose 
that such payments could generally be gifts when considered in light of 
the economic interest of the union in the success of the strike.lli Neverthe-
less, they concurred, for they found special circumstances here which they 
thought might justify the jury's concluding that the union was exercising a 
wholly charitable function in aiding the taxpayer.16 Justices Whittaker, 
Harlan, and Stewart, in the dissenting opinion, agreed with the concurring 
Justices that strike assistance should normally be included in the striker's 
o 302 U.S. 34 (1937). In this case the Court held that the question whether a transfer 
is a gift is a question of law, or of mixed law and fact, and that therefore the Court might 
exercise broad discretion in review of the conclusion of the trier of facts. 
10 Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 6, at 289. The Court defined the motive as 
the basic reason for the transferor's conduct, the dominant reason explaining the transfer. 
Id. at 286. 
11 Principal case at 304. Relevant factors listed were the form and amount of as-
sistance; conditions of personal need and lack of other sources of income, compensation, 
or public assistance; and the dependency status which surrounded the program of assistance. 
12 Ibid. Relevant factors listed were all those stated in note 11 supra plus the general 
language of the union constitution and the nature of the union as an entity. 
13 Ibid. Relevant factors were all those stated in notes 11 and 12 supra plus the fact 
that assistance was given to a class in the community in economic need. 
14 The Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 6, at 291, defined the scope 
of review. If a jury has tried the question on instructions that are correct, the verdict 
must stand if reasonable men could differ in their conclusions. The instructions here, 
according to the plurality opinion, could not be reviewed because there had been no 
timely challenge of them. The concurring Justices found the instructions to be not un-
favorable to the Government. Principal case at 315. 
15 These Justices failed to discuss the duty imposed upon the union by its constitution. 
See note 17 infra. 
16 Because of conditions in the area, the union had set up what was essentially a 
charitable relief program. Principal case at 316. See note l supra and accompanying text. 
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gross income rather than excluded as a gift. Unlike the concurring Justices, 
however, they found nothing to indicate the requisite disinterested and 
generous motive, but on the contrary found that the payments proceeded 
from a business purpose and in pursuance of a positive undertaking by the 
union to aid the striker.l 7 
All the opinions, with the exception of an additional concurring opinion 
by Mr. Justice Douglas,18 make the motive of the transferor decisive of 
whether the transfer is a gift although there appears to be no specific 
holding which is precedent for this criterion.19 The prior cases do establish 
that absence of a charitable motive precludes the possibility that the 
transfer is a gift.20 The converse-that finding the motive to be charitable 
establishes that the transfer is a gift-was not stated even as dictum in any 
case prior to Duberstein, for in those cases the presence of either a duty to 
make the transfer or of consideration for the transfer was decisive without 
discussion of motive.21 Of course, if the presence of duty or consideration 
is held as a matter of law to be conclusive of the fact that the motive was 
selfish, the results reached will be the same in any case as would be 
reached by ignoring motive. It is clear that the dissenting and concurring 
Justices in the principal case would so hold, but the same cannot be said 
of the Justices joining the plurality opinion. The latter seem to say that 
duty, whether moral or legal, is just another factor to be taken into account 
by the trier of facts in finding the motive for the transfer.22 In contrast, 
the concurring Justices isolate the relationship between the transferor and 
the transferee, and require special circumstances to overcome the implica-
17 The payments were made by the UAW in accord with art 12, § 15 of its constitution. 
The union constitution provided for a strike fund to be built up from members' dues. If 
a strike were called by a local union, it became a duty of the Executive Board to aid the 
striking members. Principal case at 329. 
18 Principal case at 325. Mr. Justice Douglas, who would broadly define the "gift" 
exclusion, felt that in the principal case a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the 
taxpayer should have been granted had one been made. 
10 This discussion is limited to the Supreme Court cases cited in notes 7, 8, and 9 
supra. For general discussions of these cases, see Comment, 8 ALA. L. REv. 102 (1955); 
Note, 38 MINN. L. REv. 152 (1954). 
20 Note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
21 This was the situation in the cases cited in note 7 supra. In Bogardus v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 9, the Court thoroughly discussed the absence of duty and consideration 
before discussing motive. The dissent in Bogardus first introduced the idea that motive 
is decisive. This idea was again voiced in dictum in the Duberstein case and in the 
principal case is adopted by the Court. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 6, at 
296 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). 
22 This appears to be a necessary consequence of the statement that the jury could 
have concluded, as a consequence of the factors listed in note 12 supra, that the payments 
did not proceed basically from the constraint of any legal or moral duty. Here the Chief 
Justice and Justices Brennan and Black are concerned with the basic motive, and permit 
the jury to decide which of the motives present was the basic one. This would seem to 
allow a finding of gift if there is any element of charity present. In contrast, the concurring 
Justices require that the transferor's only motive be charitable. Presumably, if there 
were a legal duty, its discharge would, as a matter of law, be a motive for the transfer, 
and thereby would make a gift impossible. 
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tions of selfish motives raised by this relationship.23 This approach seems 
better justified by precedent, and is clearly better suited to defining the 
limits within which a jury, or other trier of fact, will be permitted to find 
that a given transfer was a gift. 
Despite the diversity of opinion, the effect of this case on the taxability 
of strike assistance is clear. Such payments, according to a majority of the 
Court, are to be included in gross income unless there are special cir-
cumstances which would permit their exclusion as gifts under section 102 (a). 
The present case is clearly on the borderline, and if another jury were to 
find that a payment made under identical circumstances was not a gift, 
judgment would be required to be entered on that verdict. Thus the ad-
ministrative rulings24 on strike benefits, under attack here, remain valid as 
a basis for administration of the Code. Only when there are special cir-
cumstances similar to those in the principal case, and a finding by a trier of 
fact that the payment was a gift, will these rulings be inappropriate. 
Christopher Cobb 
23 The difference between the plurality and concurring opinions in the principal case 
is a reflection of the difference between the majority and concurring opinions in Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein, supra note 6. The Court in Duberstein rejected the Government's 
proposal that it define the gift exclusion by a set of presumptions based upon the relation-
ship between the transferor and the transferee, and refused to single out any factors as 
determinative of whether a transfer is a gift. The Court thus gave the broadest discretion 
to the jury. In contrast, the concurring Justices, although also rejecting the Government's 
test, thought it possible to attain greater explicitness "in isolating and emphasizing factors 
which militate against a gift in particular circumstances." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 
supra note 6, at 295. 
24 O.D. 552, 2 CuM. BULL. 73 (1920), states that strike benefits paid by a union to a 
member on strike are taxable. Rev. Rul. 57-1, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 15, 16-17, extends this 
to non-members in a situation such as the one here. The concurring opinion delivered by 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter presents a thorough analysis of the attack upon these rulings. 
Principal case at 305. 
